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Economics deals with the allocation of scarce resources 
among many consumer goals.  Water is a scarce resource 
in the southwestern states and a plentiful resource in the 
humid eastern states.  Scarcity, however, is a relative term. 
For example, in Arizona, ground water was available in vast 
amounts during the first half of the 20th century.  
Nevertheless, with the growth of cities, industries, and 
mines in the second half of the 20th century demand for 
water intensified, thus rendering ground water in Arizona a 
scarce resource.  As demand for water intensified, markets 
for water rights evolved in the Southwest United States.  
Yoram Barzel (1989) offers the following hypothesis about 
why and when people may invest efforts in obtaining 
rights: 
 
People acquire, maintain, and relinquish rights as a 
matter of choice.  Individuals take such actions 
directly in the private sector.  Indirectly through the 
state, in the public sector.  People choose to exercise 
rights when they believe the gains from such 
actions will exceed their costs.   Conversely, people 
fail to exercise rights when the gains from owning 
properties are deemed insufficient, thus placing (or 
leaving) such properties in the public domain.  What 
is found in the public domain, therefore, is what 
people have chosen not to claim (1989, Chapter 5, p. 
65). 
 
Water rights in the arid Southwest were created by 
American settlers who moved west in the middle of the 
nineteenth century and brought with them the riparian 
system, which is governed by the English common law.  
As demand for water intensified, the common law became 
incongruous with the arid southwest, and over the years, 
the most arid states abandoned the riparian doctrine and 
instead adopted the prior appropriation doctrine.  The 
origins of the prior appropriation doctrine are traced to 
miners who initially swept into the California gold fields in 
1849.  They established de facto rules for protecting rights 
to use water.  The first user was protected against a later 
arrival-the law of first in use, first in right.  Later, the 
appropriative doctrine was adopted to ground water, and it 
became known as the Colorado doctrine.  The mountain 
states (New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, 
Idaho, Wyoming and Montana) completely rejected the 
riparian doctrine and basically adopted the Colorado 
doctrine.  The humid eastern states have the riparian 
doctrine.  The California doctrine is a system that relies 
on both the riparian and the appropriative rules.  The 
Pacific Coast states (California, Oregon, and Washington), 
the Great Plains states (Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota) adopted the 
California doctrine.  These states have great heterogeneity 
in natural water supplies.  However, over the years the 
California-doctrine states have been slowly converging to 
the Colorado doctrine.  For example, in 1967 Texas 
upgraded its surface water from the English to the prior 
appropriation doctrine.  In California, the public 
reclamation districts authorized by federal and state 
legislation, own most of the irrigation water.  The rapidly 
increasing value of water since 1980 led to legislation that 
started the decentralization of the process of water 
transfers by empowering the reclamation districts to serve 
as brokers between individual users.  The aim of this 
legislation has been to encourage water transfer from low 
to high value uses.  The implication of the Barzel rule is 
that with intensification of the demand for water in the 
southwestern states, the prior appropriation doctrine will 
replace the remnants of the riparian doctrine.  In particular, 
California water users will desert their scramble water law 
and accept the appropriative market system.  I believe that 
in the future, facing a growing demand for water, following 
the Barzel rule, water users will continue to take steps 
leading eventually to a water market based on the prior 
appropriation doctrine.  The rest of this paper is devoted 
to an informal discussion of the doctrine.  
 
SURFACE WATER 
 
Surface-water rights evolved earlier than ground water 
rights.  The most arid states in the Southwest adopted the 
prior appropriation doctrine to surface water either at the 
end of the 19th century or at the start of 20th century.  The 
adoption of the prior appropriation doctrine to ground 
water occurred later in the 20th century.  For example, New 
Mexico enacted its appropriative Surface-Water Code in 
1907.  Later, in 1931, New Mexico enacted the 
Underground Water Law that adapted the state’s surface 
law to ground water.  To understand why surface-water 
rights predated ground water rights, consider a fully used 
stream.  The threat from upstream surface-water capture is 
immediate.  An upstream river user can increase his or her 
level of irrigation only by depriving downstream users of 
sufficient flows.  The appropriative system protects users 
from capture by assigning water rights based on 
consumptive use. 
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Irrigation water diverted from the stream moves into canals 
and from there onto farm fields.  Water not consumed by 
crops or evaporated moves off the fields or through the 
root zone into drains and back to the stream.  This process 
is repeated downstream of each user.  Water is “recycled” 
in the sense that some of it is used and reused.  Thus, if 
the ith agricultural user diverts S i  acre feet of water per 
year, the consumptive use of this user is S)R - (1 ii , 
where Ri  is the return-flow coefficient of this user.  
Suppose the return-flow coefficient for irrigation is 
estimated at 1/5.  A farmer who diverts 100 acre feet 
consumes only 80 acre feet.  Put differently, if this farmer 
owns 80 acre feet of consumptive use rights, he or she is 
allowed to divert a maximu m of 100 acre feet.  The typical 
return-flow coefficient of a non farm user, e.g., a city, could 
be as high as 0.5. 
 
Following Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981), consider a 
stream in which the flow at the source is Sˆ  acre feet, and 
there is a compact agreement, or a treaty calling for S  acre 
feet per year.  Assuming no evaporation and no 
augmentation to the flow below the headwater, the 
property rights of the n users along the stream would be 
protected from capture if the following equation is 
satisfied: 
.S    )S)(R  -  (1  -  S ii
n
1 = i
³åˆ  
 
As a simple illustration, consider a hypothetical stream 
with only two users in which the flow at the source is 100 
acre feet of water, with a legal obligation to leave an annual 
flow of 60 acre feet at some point downstream.  A user 
located near the source diverts 40 acre feet and returns to 
the stream 10 acre feet.  His consumptive use rights 
amount to 30 acre feet, leaving a flow of 70 acre feet in the 
stream.  At a point downstream, another user who owns 10 
acre feet of consumptive use rights, diverts 30 acre feet 
and returns to the stream 20 acre feet, thus leaving 60 acre 
feet of water as called for by the compact. 
 
Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981) also provided analysis 
showing that a market for water rights that is based on 
consumptive use is economically efficient.  They 
discussed an additional constraint that requires that at any 
point of diversion the stream flow is greater than the 
diversion.  In rare occasions, this flow constraint could be 
violated if a user upstream were to purchase large 
quantities of water rights from a user downstream, thus 
leaving a user in the middle of the stream with insufficient 
flows.  The New Mexico water law recognizes the issue of 
flow constraints.  To protect third parties-users in the 
middle-from flow deficiencies, any application to transfer 
water along the stream is examined by the state engineer.  
If the application is in proper form, it appears for three 
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the stream 
vicinity in which the transfer is proposed.   
 
Finally, if user i  with a return-flow coefficient of Ri  sells 
his/her water rights to user j with a return-flow coefficient 
of R j , user j may increase his diversion by   
.  
)R  -  (1
)R  -  (1S  =  S
j
ii
j  
User i should decrease his/her water diversion by S i  acre 
feet.  Indeed, during most of the 20th century cities, 
farmers, manufacturers, and miners in New Mexico have 
traded water rights in a lively and active markets.  All water 
transfers in New Mexico were governed by Equation (2).  
 
 
INSTREAM WATER RIGHTS 
 
The demand for instream flows is derived from recreation 
activities and our desire to preserve wildlife and aesthetic 
enjoyments-the non-traditional water uses. The problem 
of instream flows has become acute during the recent 
decades because the demand for the non-traditional water 
uses has intensified with the population growth and rising 
standard of living.  To illustrate the instream problem, 
consider the hypothetical illustration in the previous 
section.  Suppose, one day, a group of environmentalists 
decides that a flow of 70 acre feet between the two points 
of diversion is insufficient to support wildlife and fish in 
the stream.  For instance, if free and indiscriminate claiming 
of instream inflow rights were permitted, the 
environmentalists could claim rights to 75 acre feet of flow, 
attempting to force the user upstream to reduce his 
consumptive use from 30 to 25 acre feet.  This is an 
opportunistic behavior that must result in heavy legal 
costs and eventual political struggles.  An efficient 
solution that relies on the market would require 
individuals, groups, or governmental agencies interested 
in augmenting instream flows, to purchase water rights on 
the open market from users upstream and sell these rights 
to users downstream.  Such “pro-environment” 
transactions would be approved by the state engineer 
provided they are not detrimental to a third party.  In our 
hypothetical example, the environmentalists should 
purchase 5 acre feet of consumptive use from the user near 
the source of the stream, and sell these rights to the user 
downstream.  The user upstream would not be allowed to 
purchase water from the downstream user because this 
would violate the rights of the environmentalists and 
recreationists to 75 acre feet of instream flows.  
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GROUND WATER 
 
In the early stages of mining an aquifer, the threat of 
ground water capture from any group of users is not 
immediate.  Historically, given the enormous size of most 
aquifers compared with water depletion, if some users were 
to increase today their ground water pumping, the impact 
tomorrow on other users would be an infinitesimal 
lowering of the water table.  Consequently, before 
embarking on expensive demarcation of ground water 
rights, farmers would simply be content with inexpensive 
well spacing regulation.  Furthermore, since most aquifers 
had been only infinitesimally affected by droughts, there 
has been no sense of urgency among users.  Growing 
demand for water by cities, mines, and industries, coupled 
to falling water tables, would eventually pose a serious 
threat of ground water capture and consequently induce 
farmers to seek a more protective system of ground water 
rights.  In Arizona, some copper-mining companies 
attempted to capture ground water rights from farmers by 
exploiting the ambiguity of the English Doctrine.  This 
resulted in a political earthquake that gave birth to 1980 
Ground water Management Act (GMA).  The GMA 
contains some elements of the appropriative doctrine, but 
it is regulatory in nature. 
 
Let net natural recharge, return-flow coefficient and water 
pumped be denoted by, N, R and S, respectively.  Consider 
the following simplified expression for n ground water 
users overlying a certain aquifer 
N.    )S)(R  -  (1 ii
n
1 = i
³å  
The left side of the inequality is the sum of the water 
pumped by all users less what is returned to the aquifer.  
The right side is the net natural recharge.  If the left side 
pumpage minus return flows exceeds the right side natural 
recharge mining of ground water occurs.  If the two sides 
are equal, the aquifer has achieved a steady state, also 
known as self yield.  Obviously, if ground water is mined, 
the water table falls and the marginal cost of pumping 
water increases.  As the marginal cost of pumping rises, 
individual users economize in water consumption.  To 
explain what must happen in the future, we need graphic 
illustration.  In Figure 1 time is measured along the 
horizontal axis, and the depth of the water table, H, along 
the vertical axis.   If the aquifer is not sufficiently deep, say 
it has a bottom at H m  feet below the surface, the water 
table trajectory reaches the bottom of the aquifer at point 
A.  Clearly, at point A some junior ground water rights must 
be retired to bring the net pumping, )S)(R  -  (1 ii
n
1 = i
å , 
into line with the net natural recharge, N.  The water table 
trajectory is H 0 A H m .  At this point it should be 
stressed that the bottom of the aquifer is defined in 
engineering and economic terms, not physical terms.  The 
reason for this is that pumping is inefficient in the bottom 
portion of the aquifer. 
  
 
[Figure 1] 
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If the aquifer is sufficiently deep, say it is H m¢  feet below 
the surface, a steady state will eventually be reached when 
water pumping will be reduced such that the left side of 
Inequality (3) is equal to its right side.  The water table 
trajectory would be H 0 AB, approaching the level H s  
asymptotically. 
 
For three decades natural-resources economists focused 
on the issue of optimal mining of water, and designed 
optimal control schemes for ground water management for 
commonly used aquifers.  David Sanchez and I (1980) 
could show, that under the assumption of exclusiveness 
and a stable demand-for-water, “temporal optimal control 
of ground water would not enhance the welfare of farmers 
compared with a strategy of free markets (1980).”  
Meanwhile, wise policy makers designed reasonable 
systems that assigned property rights to ground water 
mining.  As I detailed in a later paper (1983), in New Mexico 
ground water rights were assigned to farmers who overlie 
the Ogallala Aquifer based on acreage and crops.  For 
example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, water rights 
were determined at 2.5 acre feet of consumptive use per 
irrigated acre. Ground water rights were assigned to non 
farm users based on average use over a certain period.  To 
estimate the future date of reaching the bottom of the 
aquifer (point A in Figure 1) the New Mexico state engineer 
took the following two steps:  First, he calculated the 
remaining stock of ground water by multiplying the 
average thickness of the aquifer by its area and then by its 
storativity coefficient.  The state engineer reserved the 
bottom one third of the aquifer for reasons mentioned 
above.  Second, he divided the remaining stock by the 
total annual consumptive water rights to obtain the time to 
exhaustion.  Because the falling water table must lead to 
rising marginal cost of pumping, this estimate was an 
understatement.  Nevertheless, in New Mexico the State 
Engineer demonstrated that property rights can be 
assigned to mining ground water. 
 
Once either the bottom of the aquifer, or the steady-state 
level is reached, the prior appropriation doctrine governing 
surface water allocation is easily adapted to ground water: 
 Total consumptive use, pumping minus return flows is the 
same as diversion minus return flows, [ )S)(R  -  (1 ii
n
1 = i
å  
].  In surface water total consumptive use along the stream 
is limited to the water flow at the source less the legally 
required flow at some point downstream ( S  -  Sˆ ).   In 
pumping ground water from the aquifer, total consumptive 
use is limited by the natural recharge (N).  Also, 
transactions between any two users are governed by 
Equation (2). 
 
A transfer of ground water from one aquifer to another, or 
surface water from one stream to another, requires 
exporting water via pipe, or a similar conveyance system. 
For example, consider user i  with a return-flow coefficient 
of 0.5, pumping from aquifer A, selling 50 acre feet of 
consumptive use to user j with a return-flow coefficient of 
1/3, pumping from aquifer B.  User i should reduce his/her 
water pumping by 100 acre feet; user j should increase his 
pumping by 75 acre feet; to protect the rights of third 
parties who overlie aquifer B, user i should export 50 acre 
feet via pipe to user j. 
 
MEASUREMENT 
 
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water rights are not 
appurtenant to the land.  Nevertheless, measurement of 
surface water use is costly.  Assume that farm land has no 
alternative use yet its marginal product is positive; to 
maximize his profit, if measurement is costless, a farmer 
selling some of his water rights should “spread” his 
remaining water over his entire lot. Nevertheless, because 
of high measurement costs of surface water, the most 
prevalent form of transfer is a transaction in which one 
farmer sells his water rights and permanently retires the 
acreage with appurtenant duty and another farmer 
purchases the water rights and enlarges his/her farm lot 
proportionately to the amount being transferred.  In 
contrast, ground water pumps can be metered and, 
moreover, the State Engineer can prevent cheating by 
monitoring the electric or gas bills for energy used at the 
pump. 
 
The measurement of return-flow coefficients is also very 
important.  For example, the Alliance for the Rio Grade 
Heritage, an environmental group in New Mexico, recently 
accused the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, that 
mainly supplies Rio Grande water to farmers, of diverting  
about three times more water than it is entitled to.  While 
the Alliance for the Rio Grade Heritage is not aware of 
return flows, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District 
cannot effectively defend itself in the courts because it 
does not posses reliable measurements of the return-flow 
coefficients of the users under its jurisdiction.  As 
predicted by the Barzel rule (1989), facing the attempt of 
the Alliance for the Rio Grande Heritage to capture some of 
its water, The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District is 
actively seeking funds for the installation of measurement 
devices to monitor return flows back to the river. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Water markets are ruled by self-interest groups always 
comparing the additional benefit with the additional cost of 
taking another step aimed at perfecting their water rights.  
There is a fair amount of determinism in the process of 
evolving water rights; in the future, as demand for water 
continues to intensify, self interest groups will take steps, 
small and large, moving in a track, leading eventually to the 
prior appropriation doctrine.  What I attempted to show in 
this paper is that we already have in place an economic 
theory that shows that if water rights are assigned 
according to the prior appropriation doctrine, and are 
based on consumptive use, and if markets are permitted to 
allocate water among users, then water rights are traded 
freely and allocated efficiently in the marketplace.  A 
century of experience in New Mexico confirms that water 
markets governed by the prior appropriation doctrine 
function smoothly.  I believe that because of the 
intensification of the demand for water in the west coast, 
self-interest groups in California and other states will take 
the necessary steps leading to water markets governed by 
the prior appropriation doctrine. 
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